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Prospectus
Blumenberg and Fried on Objecthood*

In the critical discussion on modern art, the concept of the object plays a central role. Its dominant usage belongs to a narrative in which art overcomes its traditional categories to converge on a generic conception of itself: at that point to make art no longer necessarily means to paint, sculpt, write, or compose, and it certainly does not mean to create a »work;« rather to make art is to produce »objects« or to »name« objects as art.[1] A goal of this section was to distance the modern concept of objecthood from this narrative, which is as influential as it is constricting, to reconstruct the varied contexts of the concept's usage, and thereby also to muster motivations for a renewed art-critical and arttheoretical discussion on the object and objecthood in modern and contemporary art. With my contribution, I would like to return to two authors who deviate from the dominant usage of »object« in a particularly striking manner; they do so by affirmatively connecting the concept with that of the autonomous work. The name of one of these authors is hardly unknown in the present context, even if it may not be apparent to all readers that he (also) shaped an affirmative concept of »objecthood.« I am speaking, of course, of Michael Fried (born 1939), whose essay »Art and Objecthood« from 1967 belongs to the most commented art-critical texts of recent art theory.[2] The other author, however, is a surprise guest to our discussion: in the middle of the sixties, a time when he stood out for his well known works on the genesis of early modern thought, the philosopher Hans Blumenberg (1920–1996) published a series of arttheoretical writings, which contain, among other things, a theory of the modernist artwork as an aesthetic object.[3] My treatment of these two authors, who, as far as I know, took no notice of each other, proceeds from the assumption that modern art criticism or art theory carries out an abstraction of the traditional purposes of art whenever it speaks of the »object.« The goal of my parallel readings is double: on the one hand, I want to show that this abstraction does not have to lead to historical reductionism, which the dominant usage of the concept of »objecthood« mentioned above professes; on the other hand, at the end of my reflections I will come to the thesis that both authors connect an especially insistent concretion with the object, though they conceptualize it entirely differently.

Hans Blumenberg (with Paul Valéry)

Blumenberg's reflections on objecthood, which he expounded in his 1966 essay »The Essential Ambiguity of the Aesthetic Object« (»Die essentielle Vieldeutigkeit des ästhetischen Gegenstandes«), give this concept an unconventional turn.[4] One would expect that the preference for the concept of the »aesthetic object« arises exactly in the attempt not to presuppose already a differentiation between artworks and other objects of aesthetic experience. For Blumenberg, however, the concept encompasses artworks exclusively and, moreover, only a selective group: those that neither represent nor express nor even communicate. In other words: »aesthetic objectivity« (»ästhetische Gegenständlichkeit«) is a determining condition of modernist artworks in so far as no difference exists between what they mean and what they are. While the traditional artwork fulfilled a function as a means of representation, expression, or communication, the »solidity« of an object appertains to the modern artwork, which does not refer to anything, but rather remains for its part »conspicuous.« Such »aesthetic objects« are »absolute« objects. Traditional artworks, that represent, express, or communicate X, are always tied to X and therefore not absolute. Modern artworks, in contrast, make the »absolute claim to concentrate the referential capacity of the subject on themselves;« they show the »inner necessity of their being just so and not otherwise,« and form the »absolute referential pole of aesthetic relation.«[5]

That the »aesthetic object« is an »absolute object« leads to the suspicion of its descent from the »ens necessarium« of metaphysics and natural theology. Blumenberg was, as you know, a harsh critic of secularization narratives and minted the concept of »reoccupation« (»Umbesetzung«) for the analysis of functional changes in conceptual history and the history of metaphors, changes most often concealed by secularization narratives.[6] In his use of the concept of the »absolute,« he himself performs such a reoccupation. As »absolute object« the artwork is distinguished by how it forms the center of aesthetic relations. Every subject, when it is part of an aesthetic relation, takes up its own viewpoint unlike those of other subjects with regard to this center. The absolute object corresponds to an irreducible perspectivism, which is intensified by the fact that not one, but rather every modern artwork makes the claim to form such a center. That is why »essential ambiguity,« which appears in the title of Blumenberg's essay, does not at all refer to »openness« and even less to the idea that the artwork is first produced through its interpretation. The artwork does not offer itself for observation or interpretation, but rather exerts a compulsive force, which Blumenberg very clearly emphasizes in the following words: »The compulsion to enter into the potentiality horizon of the aesthetic position is the essential criterion of aesthetic objectivity.«[7]

Blumenberg explains this power by illuminating the epistemological background of aesthetics. With regard to their »solidity« and also their »impermeability,« aesthetic objects are comparable to epistemological objects. For they too present a resistance to the subject. Yet, while the opacity of epistemological objects is experienced as a boundary, which carries with it the impulse to overcome it, aesthetic objects, in contrast, offer a pleasure that we can also share with others (even if out of each person's different perspective). The attraction that the aesthetic object exerts arises from how it shows the opaque consistence of that which we do not yet know and at the same times exonerates us from acting out of »theoretical curiosity.«

This holiday for the epistemological subject with regard to the aesthetic object is preceded by the »infinite effort« of the artist. Blumenberg describes it as »infinite« because it is not limited by any conditions of success or conclusion. To create a work, whose solidity approaches that of reality, has nothing to do with imitating nature. »Nature« is neither as »natura naturata« nor as the horizon of human goals a relevant instance; it is rather defined purely functionally as the abutment to finite epistemological endeavors. Only modern epistemological subjects, who understand nature as a resistant substrate that opposes their desire for knowledge, can also enjoy the relief from that desire for knowledge and enjoy »aesthetic objects.«[8]

With this fork between the epistemological and the art object, Blumenberg follows an observation of Paul Valéry's dialogue »Eupalinos,« to which he already devoted an interpretation in 1964.[9] In »Eupalinos, or The Architect,« first published in 1921,[10] Valéry leads us into the land of the dead, where Socrates is haunted by the question as to why he became a philosopher rather than an artist. In a dialogue with Phaedrus, Socrates develops two ideal types of the artist, the

Fig. 1 Jeff Wall, Concrete Ball, Transparency in lightbox, 204 x 260 cm, Edition 3 + 1 AP, 2003. Basel, private collection

architect and the shipbuilder, each of which is defined by a specific form of production. The architect attends to proportions and is able, with a well-composed temple, to endow matter with tone, to make material sonorous. In contrast, the shipbuilder creates forms by putting to use the forces of the sea and the wind, and is thus in league with their roar. Before Socrates transitions from the static and lawful art of architecture to the dynamic art of shipbuilding, which is always at the mercy of chance, he tells of the encounter that made him a philosopher. It was an encounter with a piece of oceanic debris, the »objet le plus ambigu au monde,« the most ambiguous object in the world. The ambiguity of the object lay in the impossibility of determining whether it was the product of a human being, another living creature, the accidental play of the waves, or all three. When Socrates threw the object back into the ocean and began to reflect on the class of object to which it might have belonged and on how artifacts, accidental formations, and byproducts of life can be distinguished at all, he became a philosopher and had definitively turned his back on the possibility of becoming an artist.

Valéry employs the concept of the object in an elementary, philosophical sense: it is that which confronts the subject. It has no further determinations at its disposal. Yet, as an object it is not simply given. Precisely because it is utterly undetermined, it poses a question as to its constitution. Socrates understands this question as an invitation to philosophize. Only in the land of the dead does he realize that a different response might have been possible: instead of a theoretical response, a poetical one, poetical in the sense of »poiesis« as creation. If he had decided, when confronted with the object, to produce such objects himself, he would have become an artist. The shipbuilder understands this lesson of the object. Like the artist, he produces artifacts whose form develops out of the contestation with the forces of wind and water. Formulated more generally, the modern artist, according to Valéry, is someone who in the process of production draws on forces that he himself cannot produce; forces that are, in fact, in conflict with human procedures. Modern art is a form of making that references a becoming – a becoming that stands in opposition to making – and that acquires its form in its altercations with this becoming. In this regard, ocean and wind have to be understood as allegorical forces, which first and foremost suggest that Valéry did not understand such becoming as an organic teleology. The object is the point of indifference at which, for the first time, product and becoming are differentiated, without it being (yet) possible to classify the object as an artifact, a living being, or an accidental formation. The artwork, though obviously an artifact, refers back to this point of indifference insofar as its own form seems to result from (responding to and resisting) the forces of becoming. Given that it remains abstracted from any further determination, Valéry's object is a prefiguration of the work.[11]

Blumenberg, who extracts this argument out of Valéry's dialogue, also sets two new accents. While Valéry places the object at the crossroads, at which philosophy chooses the wrong, purely contemplative path, alienated from »poiesis,« Blumenberg recognizes in the »aesthetic object« a complementary product to modern knowledge of nature and its understanding of nature as a resistant material. The decision between knowledge and production, about which Valéry's Socrates reflects in retrospect on his life, is not a decision between two radically different relationships to the world for the author of »The Legitimacy of the Modern Age;« rather it is one between two relations to objects of the modern epistemological subject. In contrast to Valéry, he also does not employ the fiction of an original object, whose ambiguity the artifacts of the artist return to. Objectivity is, instead, the particularity of modernist artworks. Viewed negatively, they answer the loss of credibility in art's traditional functions; viewed positively, they claim a previously unknown authority that makes every artwork into the absolute center of a singular variety of perspectives.

Blumenberg's reference to Valéry's »objet ambigu« is to be emphasized especially in the current context: for both authors, abstraction, which accompanies the concept of the object, leads to a conspicuous concretion. The decisive mistake, which Socrates made upon finding the »objet ambigu,« had already occurred before he threw the object back into the water and began to philosophize about its being. He did not recognize that even an object with an uncertain origin must be, as long as one finds it on the beach, a concrete object and therefore, in a specific way, a determinate object. Although he held it in his hand and was able to describe it retrospectively with the greatest devotion, he believed that it had to do with a radically abstract object, which does not itself have an origin, a context, or characteristics at its disposal. Anticipating a differentiation that I will discuss in the coming section, one could say that Valéry's Socrates decided in favor of abstract objecthood and against the concrete object. Blumenberg thus recognizes Valéry's lesson to be that the abstraction that accompanies the condition of the modernist artwork as an object – abstraction from its own origin and therefore from traditional genres and functions - at the same time makes possible a new form of concretion. What distinguishes the modernist artwork as an object is its »conspicuousness,« »solidity« and »impermeability;« these are the characteristics of a particularly insistent form of concretion.

Michael Fried

Departing from very different premises than Valéry and Blumenberg, Fried also addresses the object and its reductionism. His most well known thesis is that artworks must belong to a specific art, since it is only in conversation with that art that they can test, criticize, and newly ground the persuasiveness of their own conventions. Art that prefers to be simply an object, rather than either sculpture or painting, upsets the very foundation of its own success. Given that we have today actually lost our faith in the specific arts, at least in the sense of a specificity that orients itself with regard to painting and sculpture, this argument would require a far-reaching reformulation. Unlike Rosalind Krauss, whose publications over the past years attempt to find a current version of this argument,[12] Fried decided not to return to this critical ideal of high modernism. Meanwhile, he also rejects the reductionism to objecthood for further reasons, reasons that were also emphatically articulated in »Art and Objecthood.« There Fried stres-

ses »that objecthood has become an issue for modernist painting only within the past several years. This, however, is not to say that before the present situation came into being, paintings, or sculptures for that matter, simply were objects. It would, I think, be closer to the truth to say that they simply were not. The risk, even the possibility, of seeing works of art as nothing more than objects did not exist. That such a possibility began to present itself around 1960 was largely the result of developments within modernist painting. Roughly, the more nearly assimilable to objects certain advanced painting had come to seem, the more the entire history of painting since Manet could be understood – delusively, I believe – as consisting in the progressive (though ultimately inadequate) revelation to its essential objecthood, and the more urgent became the need for modernist painting to make explicit its conventional – specifically, its pictorial – essence by defeating or suspending its own objecthood through the medium of shape.«[13]

I would like to focus on one claim from this dense passage, a claim that is central to Fried's historical understanding of objecthood: »The risk, even the possibility, of seeing works of art as nothing more than objects did not exist« in art before modernism. The emphasis falls on »as nothing more than objects.« Modernist painting from Manet up to Stella first made such reductionism possible, which is not to say that it steered an inevitable path to that end. It results, rather, from a misinterpretation of modernism. The possibility of regarding an artwork as a mere object did not arise from art's internal development, but from the hypostatization of such an internal development. This hypostatization rests, roughly speaking, on two assumptions: first, that modern painting and sculpture should be interpreted as an incrementally and successively more radical critique of representation; and secondly, that this critique of representation exposes a material substratum, that is, the object as vehicle, which, at the same time, stands for the aspect of the artwork on which the critique of representation rests. The material vehicle and objecthood are simultaneously the aim and the foundation of a critique of representation, according to this view of modernism.

This view of modernism is delusive, Fried claims (and rightly so).[14] He claims furthermore that art that commits itself to such a program produces a new and thoroughly inauthentic form of representation, which he calls theatricality. Artworks that endeavor to be nothing more than objects are, above all, performances of objecthood. Fried becomes especially explicit in his observations and conclusions concerning Robert Morris's work of the mid sixties. Theatricality does not simply imply that objects are, as it were, arranged on the gallery's stage; more saliently, it contests that these object do not stand for themselves: they display no internal relations that could or should captivate us. They assume a viewer who is in the position to conceive of these objects as nothing more than a pretext for observing her experiences in her encounter with the installation. Or, expressed more generally: these works demand a viewer that can already perform an abstraction and a distantiation similar to that particular type of philosopher whose interest in an object is limited to understanding how we know an object to have a rear side that we cannot perceive. Neither this philosopher, nor viewers of Morris, expect an especially rich experience from an actual view of the rear side. Their relationships to objects are simply not authentic; they are, as Fried expresses it, theatrical.

Such artworks are mere objects in the sense that they are no more than a trigger for a certain type of experience that does not require any specific object in the first place. A second and concluding quote from »Art and Objecthood:« »What replaces the object – what does the same job of distancing or isolating the beholder, of making him a subject, that the object did in the closed room – is above all the endlessness, or objectlessness, of the approach or onrush or perspective. It is the explicitness, that is to say, the sheer persistence with which the experience presents itself as directed at him from outisde ... that simultaneously makes him a subject – makes him subject – and establishes the experience itself as something like that of an object, or rather, objecthood.«[15]

As soon as we agree with the generic logic of objecthood, Fried argues, the reference to concrete objects becomes superfluous. As decidedly as Fried declared his position against this reductionism in 1967, he understood the relationship between art and objecthood in his famous polemic not at all as dualistic, but rather as dialectical. He first returned to this dialectic in a more recent text on James Welling, then in more detail and more emphatically in the last chapter of his 2008 book »Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before,« which is devoted to Hill and Bernd Becher as well as Jeff Wall.[16] There he holds the thesis that »objecthood« can also become a characteristic of works that do not in any way follow the generic logic analyzed in »Art and Objecthood,« and for them he coins the concept of »good objecthood.« What Fried claims to show is two different things: that the oeuvre of the Bechers and some works of Jeff Wall make reference to modernist art in so far as it underwent a crisis with the reduction of the work to a mere object, and that these works formulate an artistically successful answer to the reductionism of »objecthood.« To do justice to the complexity of this argument, it would also be necessary to describe Fried's captivating interpretation of the Bechers in detail. For that I do not have the space here, which is why I will make use of a short cut that Fried himself offers when he also presents his differentiation between »bad« and »good Objecthood« using a single artwork, Jeff Wall's »Concrete Ball« from 2003 (fig. 1).[17]

What object more emphatically places the idea of a »generic object« before the eyes than a ball on a cuboid? Even the current use of such objects in our cities and parks underlines their striking lack of specificity. This context leads to seeing the motif of the concrete ball (which also gives Wall's tableau its title) as a reference to the problem of the generic object in modern art. The concrete ball in Wall's picture displays, however, a really emphatic determination, which Fried calls its »absolute situatedness:« first, with regard to its material and the material's solidity, then with regard to the other objects in the surroundings and the entire urban situation, but also with regard to a particular weather and a particular season. All of that differentiates it from all the other concrete balls that are presumably stored in the warehouse of Vancouver's department of parks and recreation, but also from the mostly hollow objects that exemplify a general »gestalt« that Fried criticized in 1967 as »theatrical.« While the latter, according to Fried, are both indifferent toward as well as eminently dependent on their context, Wall's concrete ball displays a relationship between object and context that is characterized by a reciprocal, dynamic, and open determination.

The rest of the objects are arranged on the one hand around the concrete ball, as if it were the center of an ensemble, which the bench, the tree on the left, the second pedestal on the far right, and last, but not least, the viewer before the image also belong to. On the other hand, the spatial design of this park, as far as we can deduce it from the picture, in no way suggests that the concrete ball marks the center of a spatial order. It seems, rather, that it lies on top of one among many pedestals that are always situated where a path comes to an end and a resting place is created with a bench. That such a pedestal can again be recognized in the middle ground next to the tree and in the direct vicinity of a bench speaks for this conjecture. In contrast to the pedestal in the center, however, this one does not bear a concrete ball. The pedestal that unobtrusively inches into the image from the right may also not carry a concrete ball. The picture thus invites us to experience the concrete ball as an object by determining it in relation to other objects. And while this discussion has thus far exclusively treated the motif of the concrete ball – and not the image »Concrete Ball« – it was of course the latter that made it possible for us to experience the concrete ball and its surroundings as a

world. Jeff Wall's picture puts on view how an object that stands in an exemplary fashion for the reduction to a universal – and thus also for »objecthood« – becomes an »absolutely situated« object. Though Fried himself does not makes this claim, it would be suggestive to view this transformation of a generic object into a concrete one as a process that Wall's image not only depicts, but also itself performs. Its material vehicle is a light box. As the material vehicles for advertisement posters, light boxes are, like concrete balls, generic objects of modern urban-design that are not connected with a singular place; rather they can be arbitrarily set up and moved around. Viewed in this way, »Concrete Ball« can be understood as a work that puts on view the transformation of generic »objecthood«into a situated object in such a way that the transformation connects modern life (which is characterized through generic objects like the concrete ball to a great degree) and the picturing of modern life.

Conclusion

If one only attends to their word usage, it would seem that Blumenberg and Fried pursued diametrically opposed projects, when they placed, in the middle of the sixties, the object in the center of their reflections on modernism: Blumenberg identified the modernist work with the object, while Fried recognized in object-hood a danger for the modernist work. What is actually the case, as I have tried to show, is that while »object« meant something entirely different for the two authors, both pursued in effect the same goal. They both tried to characterize the particular authority of modern artworks. The famous phrase, with which »Art and Objecthood« ends: »Presentness is grace,« can be explained with Blumenberg's thesis on the modernist work as »absolute object« without difficulty.

In contrast to Fried, who viewed, in the middle of the sixties, the modernist work as in danger, Blumenberg would only react to the crisis of modernism many years later. In his posthumously published monograph »To the Things and Back« (»Zu den Sachen und zurück«) there is a skeptical observation on the »aesthetic object that is only supposed to mean itself:« it is »dependent on a certain adjustment in attention that one could describe overall as the ›parameters‹ of its condition: mounting, pedestals, isolation from everyday perception, isolation from the context in which the object otherwise appears and functions: the unavoidable example of the bottle dryer by Duchamp, the two beer bottles on the bronzed pedestal by Jasper Johns, or the hundred Campbell's soup cans by Andy Warhol.«[18] That Blumenberg refers to »inevitable examples« evidences the view that for its part this reflection on the »paramaters« does not want to make a particular claim to originality. In actuality Blumenberg, certainly only a cursory observer of contemporary art, first reached a diagnosis in the nineties that Fried had already formulated with polemic stress in 1967. Indeed, Fried's critique in »Art and Objecthood« was based in part on the thesis that works that do not want to be anything other than mere objects are dependent in a particular way on »parameters,« such as the exhibition space as a stage, and would be therefore essentially »theatrical.«

The concept of »good objecthood« yields new affinities, but also new differences, to Blumenberg's concept of the »aesthetic object.« Both authors see in the concept of »objecthood« the possibility of explaining the peculiar concretion of artworks; they comprehend it, however, entirely differently. Blumenberg understands, as we have seen, the aesthetic object as conspicuous, solid, and opaque. The concrete ball in Wall's image could serve to illustrate this conception together with how the ball initially appears: as the center around which the bench, the tree, a second pedestal, and the viewer are arranged. With »good objecthood,« however, Fried does not refer to such an object that is singled out, is the center of its surroundings, and at the same time confronts as something opaque. He understands »good objecthood« rather as the result of specific determining conditions that this object gains from its relationship to other objects. These conditions are not simply given; instead they result from a dynamic process that still pushes the concrete ball into the center, but also brings other relationships between this object and its surroundings into play. Viewing Wall's Concrete Ball means to trace the play of these relationships and, not least, to apply that play to the work itself. The work is, in contrast to Blumenberg's conception, not itself an object; on the contrary it opens the possibility of experiencing a generic object as a concrete one.

Notes

* My thanks go to Malika Maskarinec and Anthony Mahler for translating my essay and for assisting with the English copy-editing of this section.

1 Cf. the critical account of Thierry de Duve: Kant after Duchamp. Cambridge 1996.

2 Michael Fried: Art and Objecthood. In: Artforum, 5, 1967, pp. 12–23. – I cite from the reprint in Michael Fried: Art and Objecthood. Essays and Reviews. Chicago 1998, pp. 148–172.

3 They were collected and commented in Hans Blumenberg: Ästhetische und metaphorologische Schriften. Selection and afterword by Anselm Haverkamp. Frankfurt a.M. 2001.

4 First published in: Kritik und Metaphysik. Festschrift für Heinz Heimsoeth. Ed. by Friedrich Kaulbach/Joachim Ritter. Berlin 1966, pp. 174–179. – I cite from Hans Blumenberg: Die essentielle Vieldeutigkeit des ästhetischen Gegenstandes (1966). In: Blumenberg 2001 (note 4), pp. 112–119.

5 Blumenberg 2001 (note 5), pp. 113, 115, 117.

6 Hans Blumenberg: The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. Transl. by Robert Wallace. Cambridge, Mass. 1983.

7 Blumenberg 2001 (note 5), p. 118.

8 Cf. Hans Blumenberg: »Nachahmung der Natur«. Zur Vorgeschichte der Idee des schöpferischen Menschen (1957). In: Blumenberg 2001 (note 4), pp. 9–46.

9 Hans Blumenberg: Sokrates und das »objet ambigu«. Paul Valérys Auseinandersetzung mit der Tradition der Ontologie des ästhetischen Gegenstandes (1964). In: Blumenberg 2001 (note 4) pp. 74–111. – On Blumenberg and Valéry, cf. Ralf Konersmann: Stoff für Zweifel. Blumenberg liest Valéry. In: Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 1, 1995, pp. 46–66. – Gerhard Gamm: Das Schönste, was es gibt. Blumenberg und Valéry über ästhetische Effekte. In: Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie, 6, 2012, n. 1, pp. 99–116.

10 Paul Valéry: Eupalinos, ou l'Architecte, Gallimard (1921). In: Paul Valéry: Œuvres (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 148). Ed. by Jean Hytier. Paris 1960, vol. 2, pp. 80–147. – Paul Valéry: Dialogues. Transl. by William McCausland Stewert, with two prefaces by Wallace Stevens. London 1956, pp. 65–150.

11 Christoph Menke has recently offered a compelling systematic reading of Valérys »Eupalinos.« – Christoph Menke: Die Kraft der Kunst. Frankfurt a.M. 2012, pp. 24–32.

12 Most recently with reference to Fried's writing from the mid-1960s in Rosalind Krauss: Under blue cup. Cambridge, Mass. 2011.

13 Fried 1998 (note 3), p. 160.

14 For further reflections on the problematic aspects of this (Greenbergian) idea of modernism cf. Michael Fried: An Introduction to My Art Criticism. In: Michael Fried: Art and Objecthood. Essays and Reviews. Chicago 1998, pp. 33–40. – Michael Fried: How Modernism Works. A Response to TJ Clark. In: Critical Inquiry, 9, 1983, pp. 217–234. – For a philosophical reading of Fried's account of Modernism cf. Robert Pippin: Authenticity in Painting: Remarks on Michael Fried's Art History. In: Critical Inquiry, 31, 2005, pp. 575–598. – Robert Pippin: After the Beautiful: Hegel and the Philosophy of Pictorial Modernism. Chicago 2013.

15 Fried 1998 (note 3), p. 159.

16 Michael Fried: James Welling's Lock, 1976. In: James Welling: Photographs 1974–1999. Exhb.cat. Wexner Center for the Arts. Ed. by Sarah Rogers. Columbus, Ohio 2000, pp. 25–28. – Michael Fried: Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before. New Haven/London 2008, pp. 303–333, 345.

17 Cf. Jeff Wall. Catalogue raisonné. 1978–2004. Ed. by Theodora Vischer/Heidi Naef. Göttingen 2005, p. 419.

18 Hans Blumenberg: Zu den Sachen und zurück. Frankfurt a.M. 2002, p. 202.

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